It has been argued that rule of thumb consumers substantially alter the determinacy properties of simple interest rate rules and the dynamics of an otherwise standard New-keynesian model. In this paper we show that nominal wage stickiness helps reestablishing standard results. Key …ndings are that wage stickiness i) a¤ects the shape of determinacy regions in the parameters space, restoring the relevance of the Taylor principle for the conduct of monetary policy; ii) implies that a rise in consumption in response to an innovation in government spending is not a robust feature of the model. JEL classi…cation: E52, E62.
Introduction
In the recent macroeconomic literature the paradigm of the forward looking, representative, agent is contaminated by "rule of thumb"consumers. Agents who cannot use …nancial markets to smooth consumption over time, but consume their available labor income in each period, stand next to standard forward looking agents. This framework was originally developed by Mankiw (2000) to account for the empirical relationship between consumption and disposable income, which seems stronger than suggested by the permanent income hypothesis.
Galì, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004 and 2005; GLV (2004) and GLV (2005) henceforth), Bilbiie (2005) and Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2005) show that considering rule of thumb, or non ricardian, consumers within the New Keynesian framework leads to substantially di¤erent predictions from those delivered by a standard model.
1
In this paper we generalize the New Keynesian framework with capital accumulation and rule of thumb consumers, as developed by GLV (2004) and GLV (2005) , to allow for nominal wage stickiness a là Calvo. Our key …ndings are that wage stickiness: i) alters the determinacy conditions of simple interest rate rules; ii) modify the impulse response function of the model economy after a government spending shock. GLV (2004) study determinacy properties of interest rate rules in a sticky-price economy with a fraction of rule of thumb consumers and capital accumulation. The same issue is considered by Bilbiie (2005) and Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2005) who provide an analytical treatment, but neglect capital accumulation. The general conclusion of these papers is that 1 The simple heterogeneity between households we have described, breaks the Ricardian Equivalence. For this reason rule of thumb consumers are also de…ned as non ricardian consumers and it what follows we will use the two de…nitions interchangeably. This terminology is due to Galì et al (2004) . Simmetrically standard forward looking households are de…ned as ricardian households.
the Taylor principle may fail to guarantee a unique rational expectation equilibrium in the presence of non ricardian agents. In particular Bilbiie (2005) shows that when the importance of rule of thumb consumers in the economy is larger than a certain threshold, the determinacy of the rational expectation equilibrium is, in general, guaranteed by a so called Inverted Taylor principle. In this case the interest rate rule adopted by the central bank should be such to engineer a decrease in the real interest rate in response to positive variations in the, current or expected, in ‡ation rate.
We …nd that even a mild degree of wage stickiness restores the Taylor principle as a necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy. Our analysis provides theoretical foundations to the results in Erceg et al (2005) who consider a New Keynesian model with rule of thumb consumers and sticky wages, but …nd no evidence of a failure of the Taylor principle.
Turning to the e¤ect of …scal shocks, GLV (2005) argue that rule of thumb consumers constitute a potential solution to the so called Government Spending Puzzle. Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use the VAR methodology to document that an innovation in government spending causes a persistent rise in private consumption.
Nevertheless standard DSGE models predict that a positive shock to government purchases will have a contractionary e¤ect on consumption.
2 The literature has identi…ed this sharp contrast between the implications of the theory on one hand, and empirical results on the other, as a puzzle. GLV (2005) show that the interaction between rule of thumb consumers, sticky prices and de…cit …nancing delivers a positive response of aggregate consumption to an innovation in government spending. However, in their model the crowding in of aggregate consumption is obtained through a strong response of the real wage to the …scal shock which boosts consumption of non ricardian agents. Such a sharp increase in the real wage is at odds with the evidence. Burnside et al (2004) estimate a negative response of the real wage to a spending innovation, while Blanchard and Perotti and Fatas and Mihov (2002) identify a positive but limited response.
We …nd that nominal wage stickiness prevents the large increase in the real wage in the aftermath of a government spending shock which a¤ected the GLV's model. For empirically plausible values of parameters, the positive response of aggregate consumption to an innovation in government spending vanishes.
Government purchase shocks are coupled with a raise in aggregate consumption when agents su¤er a low cost of supplying labor in terms of utility. In such a case the increase in hours worked due to the government spending shock is enough to boost consumption of ricardian agents, and to compensate for the negative wealth e¤ect, exerted by the shock, on consumption of ricardian agents.
Results are robust to various speci…cations of the Taylor rule used in the literature, including one which reacts to wage in ‡ation.
The remainder of the paper is laid as follows. Section 2 and 3 outline the model and its log-linearized version. Section 4 contains the main results. Section 5 veri…es the robustness of the results to alternative interest rate rules. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. As in GLV (2004) and GLV (2005) , households in the interval [0; ] cannot access …nancial markets and do not have an initial capital endowment. The behavior of these agents is characterized by a simple rule of thumb:
they consume their available labor income in each period. The rest of the households on the interval ( ; 1] is composed by standard ricardian households who have access to the market for physical capital and to a full set of state contingent securities. Ricardian households hold a common initial capital endowment. The period utility function is common across households and it has the following separable form
where C t (i) is agent i's consumption and L t (i) are labor hours.
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We assume a continuum of di¤erentiated labor inputs indexed by j 2 
where w is the elasticity of substitution between labor inputs. Here L d t is aggregate labor demand and W t is an index of the wages prevailing in the economy at time t. Formal de…n-itions of labor demand and of the wage index can be found in the section devoted to …rms.
Agents are distributed uniformly across unions, hence aggregate demand of labor type j is spreaded uniformly between all households. 4 It follows that the individual quantity of hours worked, L t (i), is common across households and we will denote it with L t . This must satisfy the time resource constraint
Combining the latter with (2) we obtain
The labor market structure allows to rule out di¤erences in labor income between households 3 The function u is incresing and concave while the function v is increasing and convex.
4 Thus a share of the associates of the unions are non ricardian consumers, while the remaining share is composed by non ricardian agents.
without the need to resort to contingent markets for hours. The common labor income is given by L Ricardian Households'time t nominal ‡ow budget reads as
Ricardian agents have access to a full set of state contingent assets. More precisely, in each time period t, consumers can purchase any desired state-contingent nominal payment X t+1 in period t+1 at the dollar cost E t t;t+1 X t+1 . t;t+1 denotes a stochastic discount factor between period t + 1 and t. L 
5 Erceg et al (2000) , assume, as in most of the literature on sticky wages, that each agent is the monopolistic supplier of a single labor input. In this case, assuming that agents are spreaded uniformly across unions allows to rule out di¤erences in income between households providing the same labor input (no matter whether they are ricardian or not), but it does not allow to rule out di¤erence in labor income between non ricardian agents that provide di¤erent labor inputs. This would amount to have an economy populated by an in…nity of di¤erent individuals, since non ricardian agents cannot share the risk associated to labor income ‡uctuations.
Although this framework would be of interest, it would imply a tractability problem.
where denotes the physical rate of depreciation. Capital adjustment costs are introduced through the term 
where = 1 1+ represents the discount factor, is the time preference rate and q t =
Qt
Pt is the real shadow value of installed capital, i.e. Tobin's Q. Substituting (6) into (10) we obtain the de…nition of the stochastic discount factor t;t+1 =
Pt uc(C o t ) while combining (10) and (8) we recover the following arbitrage condition on the asset market
Non ricardian households.
Non ricardian agents do not hold physical capital neither enjoy …rms' pro…ts in the form of dividend income. The nominal budget constraint of a typical non ricardian household is given by
Agents belonging to this class are forced to consume available income in each period and delegate wage decisions to unions. For these reasons there are no …rst order conditions with respect to consumption and labor supply. Similarly to GLV (2005) we let lump sum taxes (transfers) paid (received) by non ricardian households di¤er by those paid by ricardian.
Wage Setting
Nominal wage rigidities are modeled according to the Calvo (1983) mechanism. In each period a union faces a constant probability 1 w of being able to reoptimize the nominal wage. We extend the analysis in GVL (2005) and assume that the nominal wage newly reset at t, f W t , is chosen to maximize a weighted average of agents'lifetime utilities. The weights attached to the utilities of ricardian and non ricardian agents are (1 ) and , respectively.
The union problem is
subject to (3), (4), and (11). 6 The FOC with respect to f W t is that when wages are ‡exible (12) reduces to
which is identical to the wage setting equation in GLV (2005).
Firms
In each period t a …nal good Y t is produced by a perfectly competitive …rm, combining a continuum of intermediate inputs Y t (z), according to the following standard CES production function:
The producer of the …nal good takes prices as given and chooses the quantities of intermediate goods by maximizing its pro…ts. This leads to the demand of intermediate good z and to the price of the …nal good which are respectively
Intermediate inputs Y t (z) are produced by a continuum of size one of monopolistic …rms which share the following technology:
where 0 < < 1 is the share of income which goes to capital in the long run, K t 1 (z) is the time t capital service hired by …rm z, while L t (z) is …rm z 's demand of the labor input.
The latter is de…ned as
with w > 1. Firm's z demand for labor type j and the aggregate wage index are respectively
where L d t (z) are units of labor bundle demand by …rm z. The nominal marginal cost is given by
Price setting. We assume …rms set prices according to the same mechanism assumed for wage setting. Firms in each period have a chance 1 p to reoptimize their price. A price setter z takes into account that the choice of its time t nominal price, e P t , might a¤ect not only current but also future pro…ts. The …rst order condition for price setting is:
which can be given the usual interpretation. 7 Notice that p = p p 1 represents the markup over the price which would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities.
Government
The Government nominal ‡ow budget constraint is
where P t G t is nominal government expenditure on the …nal good. We assume a …scal rule of the form
where
. g t is assumed to follow a …rst order autoregressive process g t = g g t 1 + " g t where 0 g 1 and " g t is a normally distributed 7 Recall that t is the value of an additional dollar for a ricardian household. It is the lagrange multiplier on ricardian househols nominal ‡ow budget constraint.
zero-mean random shock to government spending. 8
Monetary Policy
An interest rate-setting rule is required for the dynamic of the model to be fully speci…ed.
Our baseline parameterization features the central bank setting the nominal interest rate as a function of current in ‡ation according to the following log-linear rule
where r t = log 
Aggregation
We denote aggregate consumption, lump sum taxes, capital, investment, dividends and bonds with C t , T t , K t , I t , D t and B t , respectively. These are de…ned as
8 A su¢ cient condition for non explosive debt dynamics is
We assume this condition is satis…ed throughout.
Market Clearing
The clearing of good and labor markets requires
dz denotes …rms'aggregate demand of the composite labor input. The clearing condition of the market for physical capital reads as
Steady State
As in GLV, steady state lump sum taxes are such that steady state consumption levels are equalized across agents. Variables without time subscript denote steady state values. Firm i's cost minimization implies
Since the ratio G Y = g is, by assumption, exogenous, we can determine the steady state share of consumption on output, c , as follows
which, as noticed by GLV, is independent of . In what follows it will prove useful to know
To make our results readily comparable to those in Bilbiie (2005) and GLV (2005) we adopt the same period utility function considered in their works:
which features a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and a constant elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor v LL = . 9 In what follows lower case letters denote log-deviations from the steady state values. The log-deviation of the real wage, denoted by w t , constitutes the only exception to this rule. The conditions which de…ne the log-linear approximation to equations of the model are derived in GLV (2005) and we report them in the appendix. We provide, instead, a detailed derivation of the wage in ‡ation curve and of the real wage schedule.
3.1 Wage in ‡ation, the real wage schedule and the e¤ect of economic activity on the real wage.
In the case of identical steady state consumption levels, agents have a common steady state marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption. This implies that equation (12) can be given the following log-linear approximation the average marginal rate of substitution. Given the selected functional forms, the (log)wage optimally chosen at time t is de…ned as
Combining the latter with the following, standard, log-linear approximation of the wage index
we obtain the desired wage in ‡ation curve
where w =
(1 w )(1 w ) w and w t = (log W t log P t ) (log w + log C t + log L t ) is the wage mark-up that unions impose over the average marginal rate of substitution. 10 Notice that since unions maximize a weighted average of agents'utilities, the wage in ‡ation curve takes a standard form. Equation (19) allows to obtain the log-deviation of time t real wage, which plays a prominent role in the determination of non ricardian agents consumption, as follows . determines both the degree of forward and backward lookingness.
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Today's average real wage is a function of its lagged and expected value, expected and current in ‡ation. The term l d t + c t represents the average real wage that would prevail in the case of wage ‡exibility.
1 0 As pointed out by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a), the coe¢ cient w is di¤erent form that in Erceg et al (2000) , which is the standard reference for the analysis of nominal wage stickiness.The reason is that we have assumed that agents provide all labor inputs. In the more standard case in which each individual is the monopolistic supplier of a given labor input, w would be equal to
hence lower than in the case we consider. Substituting (29) into (20) we obtain:
where = w (1 ) determines the e¤ect on the real wage due to changes in the level of real activity.
Comparative statics. the higher is , the higher is the sensitivity of wages to an increase in economic activity. @ @ w < 0: the higher is average duration of wage contracts, i.e. the higher is w , the lower is the sensitivity of wages to an increase in economic activity. The same can be said for what concerns the sensitivity of the real wage to hours.
Intuition goes as follows. A higher w implies that the nominal wage will be newly reset on a limited number of labor markets, thus the previous period average wage has a stronger in ‡uence on today's. At the same time those unions which optimally reset their wage will attach a higher weight on expected future variables.
The parameter determines the size of the variation in real wage associated with a given variation in real economic activity. This is jointly determined by the probability that wages cannot be changed in a given period, w , and the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor, . Woodford and Rotemberg (1997) report evidence suggesting that the output elasticity of real wage is in a neighborhood of 0.3. This value is, however, far from consistent with the microeconomic evidence on the elasticity of labor supply and from standard calibration of preferences.
Results

Calibration
We calibrate the parameters of the model since the analysis of equilibrium determinacy and equilibrium dynamics that follow draws on numerical results. The time unit is meant to be a quarter. In the baseline parametrization we set w = 0:75, which implies an average duration of wage contracts of one year as suggested by the estimates in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Levine et al (2005) . and assume the standard values of 1 3 and 0:99 respectively. Table 1 reports the output sensitivity of real wage as a function of . In column 2 we consider the baseline calibration for wage stickiness, while in column 4 we evaluate under the limiting case of wage ‡exibility. Table 1 shows that, under the baseline calibration for wage stickiness, setting = 4:84 allows to match the output elasticity of real wage reported by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), thus we take this value as the baseline. However, to evaluate the dependence of the model's implications on the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor, we consider two other values of beside the baseline. The …rst, = 0:2, corresponds to the value employed by GLV (2005), the second = 3 is chosen because commonly employed in the literature. Table 1 , consistently with the discussion in the previous section, points out that when standard values are assigned to , the ‡exible wage scenario leads to extremely high output sensitivity of real wage. The baseline value for the share of non ricardian consumers, , is 0.5. This is consistent with the estimates in Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Muscatelli et al (2003) . Remaining parameters are displayed in Table 2 , and the reader can refer to the references reported in GLV (2005) for empirical evidence supporting them. However, it is worth mentioning that in the baseline calibration is set to 1:5. Thus monetary policy is assumed to satisfy the standard Taylor Principle. To develop intuition behind this result, we build on the economic mechanism emphasized by Bilbiie (2005) . To isolate the e¤ect of wage stickiness on determinacy conditions it is initially convenient to assume that wages are ‡exible.
Suppose that the level of in ‡ation starts increasing without any change in fundamentals that could justify it. To the extent that the central bank follows the Taylor Principle, the real interest rate increases in the aftermath of the rise in in ‡ation. This has a contractionary e¤ect on consumption of ricardian agents. Due to lower demand, some …rms …x a lower price, while, …rms which are prevented from doing it, reduce labor demand, putting a downward pressure on the real wage. As a result real marginal costs decrease and there is an increase in pro…ts.
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The latter implies a positive wealth e¤ect on consumption of ricardian consumers, who own …rms and enjoy pro…ts in the form of dividend income. Notice that, due to aggregation, a one unit increase in pro…ts leads to a 1 1 increase in individual dividend income. As a consequence, when the share of rule of thumb consumers is above a given threshold, the wealth e¤ect stemming from a pro…ts' increase may lead to a rise in aggregate demand.
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If this is the case, the sunspot in in ‡ation could become self-ful…lling through the positive relationship between output and in ‡ation implied by the NKPC. As pointed out by Bilbiie (2005) an interest rate rule satis…ed the Inverted Taylor Principle, would lead to a fall in pro…ts, making the initial increase in in ‡ation non compatible with a rational expectation equilibrium.
How does wage stickiness alter the adjustment process described above?
The key point is that wage stickiness dampens variation in the real wage associated to changes in hours. Thus, for a given reduction of labor demand, real marginal costs do not 1 2 The increse in pro…ts becomes stronger as the marginal elasticity of labor disutility, , increases. In this case small variations in hours are accompanied by large variations in the real wage. decrease as they would if wages were ‡exible. In this case the wealth e¤ect produced by the increase in pro…ts does not o¤set the substitution e¤ect exerted on demand of ricardian consumers by the initial real rate increase. This prevents the rise in demand that could ex-post rationalize the sunspot in in ‡ation.
Similarly to GLV (2004) we …nd that when strong price stickiness coexists with a large share of non ricardian consumers the Taylor Principle, although necessary, needs to be strenghtened to enforce a unique rational expectation equilibrium. With respect to the process described above, the presence of extreme price stickiness may, in fact, lead to an increase in the real wage in the aftermath of the sunspot in in ‡ation. This would boost consumption of non ricardian consumers. Since non ricardian agents'demand is insensitive to changes in the interest rate, the only way in which the central bank could control aggregate demand would be that of further depressing demand of ricardian agents engineering a stronger increase in the rate of interest. However, we raise an important quali…cation with respect to the analysis in GLV (2004) . Namely, that the Taylor Principle remains a valid criterion to avoid sunspot ‡uctuations when the relevant parameters ( w , p , ) assume values compatible with the empirical estimates. In fact, under the baseline calibration, the Taylor Principle is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for determinacy for values of the price stickiness parameter p 0:79. This threshold value corresponds to an average lifetime of price contracts of 4.8 quarters, which is sensibly larger than that estimated in empirical works. In sum, our analysis shows that rule of thumb consumers do not invalidate the relevance of the Taylor Principle when nominal wage stickiness, an uncontroversial empirical fact, is considered. In what follows we assess the sensitivity of result 2 to alternative parameterization of the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor ( ) and to the share of non ricardian consumers ( ).
Consumption and Government Spending Shocks.
In Figure 5 we evaluate the sensitivity to . Dotted lines correspond to the value chosen by GVL (2005) , dashed lines to the case = 3, while solid lines to the baseline value.
Result 3. Impact response of aggregate consumption and . The e¤ect of a Government spending shock on private consumption is positive when the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor, , is low.
Consider the case where = 0:2, which corresponds to the calibration adopted by GVL (2005) . Under this parameterization (see Table 1 ), wage stickiness implies an extremely low sensitivity of the real wage to economic activity and to changes in hours. In this case the government spending shock leads to a negligible increase in the real wage. This causes a mild rise in real marginal costs and, thus, in in ‡ation. As a consequence, the real interest rate grows modestly and the reduction in ricardian agents'consumption is well below those registered in the case where is larger. At the same time, when = 0:2, the strong increase in hours brings about an increase in consumption of ricardian agents which is larger than under the other parameterizations.
In sum, when the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor is low the impulse responses of both agents'consumption levels are favorable to a positive impact variation of aggregate consumption with respect to the baseline case.
However as the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor approaches the values supported by the empirical evidence the response of the real wage to the innovation in government spending gets stronger, although it remains much lower than in GVL (2005) . In this case the variation in in ‡ation is such to imply a stronger reaction of the real interest rate which depresses consumption of ricardian consumers. Finally the joint movement of real wage and hours dampens the change in consumption of non ricardian agents and prevents an increase in aggregate consumption. Notice that monetary policy, plays a crucial role for this results since it impacts on ricardian agents consumption through its e¤ect on the real interest rate.
The robustness of our results to alternative interest rate setting rules in explored below.
We conclude this section assessing the role played by the share of non ricardian consumers,
. A clear result emerges from …gure 6. 
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In this section we discuss whether Results 1 and 2 are robust to simple variant of the Taylor rules proposed in the literature.
We consider rules which are specialization of the, general, instrumental rule
When i = 1, (22) reduces to a backward looking rule, when i = 0 it corresponds to a contemporaneous rule and when i = 1 it becomes a forward looking rule. For each of the speci…cations mentioned we consider the case of inertia, with r = 0:5.
Determinacy. Reacting to output deviation determines a less marked increase in production in the aftermath of the shock, containing the variation in hours worked and, thus, in consumption of non ricardian consumers.
6 Conclusions
We regard a framework where current income a¤ects consumption possibilities as a promising step towards realism in economic modeling. In this case, however, it should be taken into account that labor markets and the wage setting process are subject to some form of imperfections. In an economy populated by an exogenous share of non ricardian consumers, wage stickiness a¤ects both the response of aggregate variables to a government spending shock and the conditions for equilibrium determinacy. Once wage stickiness is considered, the positive e¤ect of government spending on aggregate consumption reported by the empirical studies of, inter alia, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , is not a robust feature of the model with rule of thumb consumers. In particular, it can be replicated just when the marginal disutility of labor e¤ort is low. Contrary to Bilbiie (2005) and GLV (2004) For what concerns the feature of welfare maximizing monetary policy, we conjecture that the optimality of a passive monetary rule, as advocated by Bilbiie (2005) in a sticky prices‡exible wages economy, could be altered by considering a modest degree of wage stickiness.
The latter aspect is part of our ongoing research.
the log-linear form
Log-linearization of equations (7) and (9) leads to the dynamic of (real)Tobin's Q
and its relationship with investment:
Equation ( 
The stock of capital evolves according to
Log-linearization of the aggregate resource constraint around the steady state yields
where e c = c + g . As in shown by Woodford (2003) a log-linear approximation to the aggregate production function is given by
Assuming that steady state stock of debt is zero and a steady state balanced government budget, the dynamic of debt around the steady state yields the following law of motion for the stock of debt
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is obtained through log-linearization of condition (15) and reads as
where p = (1 p )(1 p ) p and mc t = (1 ) w t + r k t is the real marginal cost.
Equations (23) through (31), equation (21) together with the policy rules (17) and (18) determine the equilibrium path of the economy we have outlined. Instability area in black. 
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